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GROUNDED AT THE PLEADING STAGE: HOW DO TSA
AGENTS ASSESS A PEACEFUL PROTEST VERSUS A
DISRUPTIVE ONE?
PETER THOMPSON*
I. INTRODUCTION: FREE SPEECH VS.
DISRUPTIVE BEHAVIOR
N TOBEY V JONES, the Fourth Circuit held that a man ar-
rested by Transportation Security Administration (TSA)
agents after he protested airport screening procedures by strip-
ping off his shirt and displaying the text of the Fourth Amend-
ment on his chest could proceed past the pleading stage on a
potential First Amendment violation.' While the court properly
found that "protest against governmental policies goes directly
to the heart of the First Amendment,"' it failed to draw a line
between what constitutes free speech and what constitutes dis-
ruptive behavior in a zone of high security.3 The Fourth Circuit
was correct in its decision; in a post-September 11, 2001 (9/11)
age, the court valiantly took a stand against the continuous ero-
sion of First Amendment rights by recognizing a person's right
to non-violent protest, even in an airport security line. But
while the court correctly determined that the agents may have
responded unreasonably to Mr. Tobey's "bizarre" exercise of
free speech, it failed to provide guidance on what constitutes
disruptive behavior.' The court's position thus creates danger-
* Peter Thompson is a candidate forJuris Doctor, May 2015, at SMU Dedman
School of Law. He received his B.A. in English and B.J. in Journalism from The
University of Texas at Austin in 2001. Peter would like to thank his friends and
family, especially his beautiful wife, Courtney, for their love and support.
I Tobey v. Jones, 706 F.3d 379, 383-84 (4th Cir. 2013).
2 See id. at 393.
3 See id. at 390-94.
4 See id. at 387, 393.
5 See id. at 388-90.
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ous ambiguity for TSA agents assessing behavior in a high-secur-
ity zone and needlessly exposes them to damages liability.6
In this case, "Aaron Tobey was scheduled to fly from Rich-
mond[, Virginia] to Wisconsin."7 He "waited until there was a
short line at the TSA screening checkpoint . .. and proceeded
to the conveyor belt area [where he] placed his belt, shoes,
sweatshirt, and other carry-on items on the conveyor."' "Tobey
was then diverted by [an agent] to the [Advanced Imaging
Technology (AIT) ] scanning unit for enhanced screening."9 Be-
cause Tobey believed that enhanced screening was unconstitu-
tional, he "had written the text of the Fourth Amendment on
his chest."10 He "calmly" took off his T-shirt and placed it on the
conveyor belt." A TSA agent told him not to remove his shirt,
but Tobey "calmly responded that he wished to express his view
that [the] TSA's enhanced screening procedures were unconsti-
tutional."" The agent then "radioed for assistance," and Tobey
was arrested shortly thereafter for disorderly conduct."
The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia
originally granted the TSA's motion to dismiss in part and de-
nied it in part.14 The TSA then filed an interlocutory appeal of
the district court's denial of qualified immunity with respect to
the First Amendment retaliation claim." The Fourth Circuit
held that the complaint raised a plausible inference that TSA
officials caused the arrest of the passenger and that the arrest
gave rise to a cognizable First Amendment retaliation claim.1 6
II. LEGAL FRAMEWORK MAJORITY CALLS PROTEST
PEACEFUL .. . AND POSSIBLY DISRUPTIVE?
In this case, the court reminded both parties that "the First
Amendment prohibits an officer from retaliating against an in-
dividual for speaking critically of the government."' 7 It invoked
clearly established precedent "that the First Amendment pro-
6 See id. at 385-91.
7 Id. at 383.
8 Id.





14 Id. at 383.
15 Id.
16 Id. at 383, 386-87.
17 Id. at 391.
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tects peaceful nondisruptive speech in an airport, and that such
speech cannot be suppressed solely because the government dis-
agrees with it."' 8 Therefore, the court determined that Tobey's
right to engage in a "peaceful non-disruptive . . . protest of a
government policy without recourse was clearly established at
the time of his arrest."" The court initially stated that Tobey's
behavior was "peaceful, cooperative, and polite" but ultimately
held that it could not determine whether Tobey's behavior was
"disruptive" at the Rule 12(b) (6) motion to dismiss phase.2 0
The court relied on Mills v. Alabama to illustrate the "universal
agreement that a major purpose of th[e First] Amendment [is]
to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs."2 1 That
case concerned the issue of whether a state could make it a
crime for the editor of a daily newspaper to "publish [ ] an edito-
rial on election day urging people to vote a particular way in the
election."2 2 In the instant case, the Tobey court held that this
principle of free discussion applies to many different forums,
including an airport.23 As discussed in Board of Airport Commis-
sioners of Los Angeles v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., the Supreme Court
stated that "nondisruptive speech-such as the wearing of a T-
shirt or a button that contains a political message-may not be
'airport related,' but [it] is still protected speech even in a non-
public forum. "24 In that case, the Supreme Court held that a
broad ordinance restricting freedom of speech in an airport was
unconstitutional.25 The Tobey court concluded its analysis by
quoting United States v. Kokinda, which held that "a government
official cannot 'suppress expression merely because [he or she]
oppose[s] the speaker's view.'" 26 But in Kokinda, the Supreme
Court held that it was reasonable for the U.S. Postal Service to
prohibit solicitation on a postal sidewalk "where the intrusion
creates significant interference with Congress' [sic] mandate to
ensure the most effective and efficient distribution of the
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Id. at 393.
21 Id. at 391 (quoting Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966)).
22 Mills, 384 U.S. at 218.
23 Tobey, 706 F.3d at 391.
24 See Bd. of Airport Comm'rs of L.A. v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569, 576
(1987).
25 See id. at 570, 577.
26 See Tobey, 706 F.3d at 391 (quoting United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720,
721 (1990)).
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mails."2 The Court held that "[w]hether or not the [Postal] Ser-
vice permits other forms of speech, . . . it is not unreasonable to
prohibit solicitation on the ground that it is . . . disruptive of
business" because it "impedes the normal flow of traffic."2"
III. DISSENT: STRIPPING OFF SHIRT IS DISRUPTIVE AS
A MATTER OF COMMON SENSE
Dissenting Judge Wilkinson honed in on the potentially dis-
ruptive nature of Tobey's conduct in that "he began stripping
off his clothes inside the security screening area and continued
to do so even after [one defendant] advised that removal of
clothing was unnecessary."29 The dissent emphasized how such
"disruptive" behavior contradicted the majority's determination
that Tobey "remained quiet, composed, polite, cooperative, and
complied with the requests of [the] agents and officers."3 0 In
determining whether Tobey's conduct was sufficiently "disrup-
tive" so as to defeat his claim for relief, the dissent looked to
Ashcroft v. Iqbal for guidance." In that case, the Supreme Court
held that when "[d]etermining whether a complaint states a
plausible claim for relief[,] . . . the reviewing court [should]
draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Judge Wil-
kinson asserted that taking off one's shirt and exposing one's
chest in an airport screening area is disruptive as "a simple mat-
ter of common sense."33 The dissent pointed out that neither
Tobey nor the majority cited any case involving "conduct that
disrupts security-screening activities." 3 In addition, the dissent
emphasized that Tobey's counsel conceded that Tobey's behav-
ior was "bizarre" and that even "Tobey himself anticipated the
disruption his behavior might cause, . . . [such as] inevitabl[e]
delays [to] the screening process for other passengers."13
As stated above, the majority-while it determined that To-
bey's behavior was "peaceful" and "cooperative"-left open the
door that Tobey's behavior could somehow also be "disrup-
27 Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 735.
28 Id. at 733.
29 See Tobey, 706 F.3d at 397 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting).
30 See id.
31 See id.
32 Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009)).
3 See id.
- Id.
35 Id. at 397-98.
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tive."3 6 The court found that "[w]hether Mr. Tobey was in fact
'disruptive' [wa]s a disputed question of fact"; the court contin-
ued, stating, "Appellants seem to think that removing clothing is
per se disruptive. We beg to differ. Passengers routinely remove
clothing at an airport screening station, and in fact are required
to do so by TSA regulations."" But in seeming contradiction,
the court also suggested that Tobey could have been "disrup-
tive" and even speculated that "[p]erhaps [he] took off his shirt,
twirled it around his head, and ripped off his pants with a dra-
matic flourish, indeed causing a great spectacle."" The court
said that it could not decide this issue on a 12(b) (6) motion; "at
this stage of the proceeding, [the court was] satisfied that Mr.
Tobey ha[d] adequately pled that Appellants violated his clearly
established First Amendment rights."3" But the dissent asserted
that qualified immunity should apply to the TSA agents-
thereby "lead [ing] inexorably to the conclusion that th[e] com-
plaint must be dismissed"-because the conflicting "legal stan-
dard identified by Tobey and the majority as governing this case
could not possibly have provided adequate notice to defendants
that their alleged actions were unlawful."40
IV. ANALYSIS: COURT REACHES RIGHT RESULT BUT
CREATES DANGEROUS AMBIGUITY
The majority in Tobey reached the right result but ventured
down a perilous path when it mentioned-but declined to fully
address-what constitutes disruptive behavior at the pleading
stage.4 1 While it is true that what behavior qualifies as "disrup-
tive" may be a question of fact, the court failed to properly con-
sider both the safety issues at stake and the discretionary
functions carried out by the TSA agents.4 2 As the dissent pointed
out, a disturbance at the airport security line could have created
a diversion for some other terrorist activity to be carried out.4 3
Here, the court sent mixed messages as to what kinds of behav-
ior and what types of responses are appropriate in a high-secur-
36 Id. at 388-89, 393 (majority opinion).
3 Id. 388-89.
38 Id.
3 Id. at 389, 394.
- Id. at 396 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting).
41 See id. at 388-89, 393 (majority opinion).
42 See id.
4 Id. at 394 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting).
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ity zone. 4 The majority made a concrete determination that
Tobey's behavior was clearly "peaceful, cooperative, and polite,"
but then later stated that such behavior could have very well
been "disruptive."4 5 These statements conflict and create poten-
tially dangerous ambiguity. As the dissent warned, when a gray
area exists as to what constitutes free speech and what consti-
tutes disruptive behavior, it puts TSA agents into a difficult posi-
tion, forcing them to make split-second judgment calls in a high-
security area where-in the worst case-lives might be in dan-
ger.4 6 This ambiguity could be avoided if the court simply ad-
dressed the subject matter relevant to the 12(b) (6) motion to
dismiss. For instance, if Tobey was in fact peaceful and coopera-
tive as suggested in the factual allegations of the pleadings, the
court could have held there was no question that his First Amend-
ment claim should advance past the pleading stage. Instead, the
court needlessly complicated the issue by acknowledging that
Tobey's behavior might have also been disruptive,4 7 thereby cre-
ating an ambiguity that could confuse the standards under
which TSA agents operate and potentially expose them to
liability.48
A. TSA AGENTS NEED PROPER NOTICE OF LEGAL STANDARDS
TSA agents need a specific framework under which to operate
when screening passengers at the airport. If they are forced to
make split-second decisions about whether someone's behavior
constitutes an expression of free speech or is "disruptive," and
are then exposed to liability for taking action, they run the risk
of losing their own rights to due process.4 9 As government offi-
cials attempting to carry out discretionary functions, TSA agents
should enjoy qualified immunity as "long as they do not violate
'clearly established' law."5 0
However, what constitutes "clearly established law" raises a
challenging issue in this case. Initially, the court made the cor-
rect determination: this was a calm, non-disruptive protest car-
ried out in a cooperative manner.5 ' Therefore, since the First
- See id. at 386-94 (majority opinion).
45 Id. at 393.
46 See id. at 394-95 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting).
47 See id. at 393 (majority opinion).
4 See id. at 394-95 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting).
49 See id. at 394.
5o See id.
5' Id. at 393 (majority opinion).
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Amendment applies to an airport screening area, the court held
that the complaint should advance past the pleading stage. But
the court conditioned its finding on the premise that it could
not determine whether Tobey's behavior was "disruptive" and
that any number of scenarios might have existed where the be-
havior could have become disruptive. 3 This may show the
court's unease with its own decision, or at the very least, its con-
cern over the risks inherent in a high-security zone. But either
way, it drastically undermines the court's initial confident assess-
ment of the factual allegations in the pleadings." The court's
only charge was to determine the factual plausibility of the
pleadings, and once it made this determination, it should not
have injected uncertainty as to whether Tobey's behavior was
disruptive.
As the dissent pointed out, TSA agents need bright-line rules
to quickly confront security risks because any disruption may
create "a diversion that nefarious actors could . . . exploit[ ] to
dangerous effect."5 5 But TSA agents can certainly go too far; in
this case, if the factual allegations are true, the agents clearly
violated Tobey's First Amendment rights when they immediately
arrested him in the middle of a non-violent protest.56 The court
reached this result, but by stating it would not determine
whether the action was disruptive, it created an ambiguity that
translates into a gray area for TSA agents attempting to carry out
their duties. A man who quietly and calmly takes his shirt off in
protest at an airport screening area is either properly exercising
his First Amendment rights or he is a creating a disruption. The
court should not be able to firmly pick one conclusion, then
open the door to the other conclusion and expect to create a
stable framework under which TSA agents can operate. Because
the court created this conflict between "peaceful, cooperative"
conduct and potentially "disruptive" behavior,5 8 TSA agents at-
tempting to make the right judgment call now face "being
hauled into court and threatened with damages liability for
52 See id. at 390-91.
53 See id. at 388-89.
54 See id. at 387-88.
55 See id. at 394-95 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting).
56 Id. at 387-88 (majority opinion).
57 Id. at 387-89.
58 Id.
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those decisions, having never received sufficient notice as to the
legal standards by which [their] conduct would be judged."5 9
B. RULES NEED TO BE DETERMINED AT PLEADING STAGE
The majority emphasized that "[w]hether Mr. Tobey was in
fact 'disruptive' [wa]s a disputed question of fact at this junc-
ture."6 0 This is certainly true in one respect: once Tobey's com-
plaint advanced past the pleading stage, the agents were
obviously free to argue that his behavior was disruptive. But, as
stated above, the majority went further and asserted that
"[a]ppellants seem to think that removing clothing is per se dis-
ruptive" and, furthermore, that "[p]assengers routinely remove
clothing at an airport screening station."" While the court may
seem to be supporting its position here by stating that removing
clothing is not per se disruptive, it opens up the topic of what
constitutes disruptive behavior to further debate, which, as dis-
cussed above, clouds the picture for TSA agents on how they
should address security issues.62 The conflicting message this
sends .to TSA agents is as follows: (1) if the protest is peaceful
and non-violent, you should not arrest; but (2) if a protestor
quietly takes his shirt off, this is not per se disruptive, but may
be, so if you choose to arrest, you may or may not be subject to
liability.6 3 Such ambuiguity requires TSA agents to venture down
an unnecessarily convoluted line of thinking when assessing se-
curity risks. What is supposedly a "question of fact" now becomes
a point of confusion for a TSA agent forced to make a prompt
judgment call.
Potential solutions for TSA agents may be derived from the
leeway the Supreme Court granted the Postal Service in
Kokinda.64 In that case, the Court recognized the Postal Service's
need to prohibit solicitation on the grounds that it impeded
Congress's mandate to efficiently distribute the mail.6 5 This con-
stituted a legitimate reason separate from any desire by the Pos-
tal Service to "suppress expression merely because [it]
oppose[s] the speaker's view. "66 Therefore, the Postal Service
51 Id. at 394 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting).
60 Id. at 388 (majority opinion).
61 Id.
62 See id. at 388-89.
63 See id.
64 See United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 735-37 (1990).
65 See id. at 735, 737.
66 See id. at 730, 732-37.
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can now prohibit solicitation on its property-a clear bright-line
rule that a postal worker can confidently follow without risking
exposure to damages liability.67 If someone pled a violation of
First Amendment rights against a postal worker who prevented
him from soliciting on post office property, the complaint would
never advance past the pleading stage." The need for similar
clarity arises in the instant case. Congress has tasked TSA agents
with the important duty of maintaining safety at airports and
responding to security risks as they arise.69 To facilitate the most
rapid and effective response in this high-security atmosphere, it
is imperative that TSA agents know what they can and cannot do
to prevent unnecessary delays in the airport security line and,
more importantly, to efficiently appraise security risks. This type
of bright-line rule would also help the courts determine the va-
lidity of a complaint from the outset of a case.
Initially, the court here did exactly that when it held that free
speech in an airport is well-established and that Tobey con-
ducted himself in a non-violent manner.7 o But because the court
considers whether behavior qualifies as "disruptive" to be a ques-
tion of fact,7 1 it creates a large gray area for TSA agents: govern-
ment employees carrying out discretionary functions have no
real bright-line rule to follow except for their own judgment,
which could easily expose them to liability.72 At the very least,
the court here should determine whether the act of a man re-
moving his shirt in an airport security line is disruptive; if done
calmly and non-violently, it most certainly should be considered
non-disruptive and a proper exercise of the man's First Amend-
ment rights. The court set out on this path but undermined it-
self with a risky detour that could expose TSA agents to
unnecessary damages liability.73
V. CONCLUSION
At first glance, the majority appeared to make a good decision
in the case, butjustice was fleeting as the court failed to properly
account for the challenges that TSA scanners face in conducting
their duties. Even on a Rule 12(b) (6) motion to dismiss, the
67 See id. at 732-37.
68 See id.
69 See Tobey v. Jones, 706 F.3d 379, 383 (4th Cir. 2013).
7o See id. at 387, 391.
71 See id. at 388.
72 See id. at 394-95 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting).
7 See id. at 387-89 (majority opinion).
2014] 199
200 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [79
court undermined its holding when it held that a peaceful and
non-violent protest could also potentially be disruptive." In the
post-9/11 age, it is imperative for Americans to guard against
the erosion of their First Amendment rights. But it is also impor-
tant that security personnel have well-defined parameters for do-
ing their jobs. While the court initially reached the right result
in this case, it did so by sending a convoluted message that failed
to fully appreciate the need for well-articulated rules that secur-
ity personnel can follow. TSA agents-unlike judges and jus-
tices-do not have the luxury of thoughtfully appraising each
situation they encounter. They frequently have only seconds to
assess circumstances and make decisions. They do not need un-
necessary gray areas. Here the court artfully concluded that it
was plausible that agents violated Tobey's First Amendment
rights. After reaching this determinative point, the court should
have ended its analysis instead of venturing into the precarious
land of liability outside of the factual allegations set forth in the
pleadings.
74 See id.
